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6 August 2001: Paul 
I want to begin with a little report from The Weekend Australian (‘Alien’ 2001, 19):  
 
Yesterday The Canberra Times ran this self-explanatory apology for a phrase in 
its Tuesday editorial. ‘Most One Nation supporters are “average Australians”, 
not “average stray aliens”, as the editorial on Tuesday quoted the Prime 
Minister as saying. The error began with voice-recognition technology, and was 
missed by the author and sub-editors’.  
 
However inadvertently, this misrecognition of the current conservative Australian 
Prime Minister’s voice has produced perhaps the best definition of the Australian 
national identity of our time: ‘average stray aliens’. The phrase is connotatively rich 
and supplies one particularly insistent signifying thread here, to do with the Australian 
state’s European origins and the widely held belief that Australia represents to various 
degrees the end-result of Europe transplanted. And if a place called Europe can be 
transplanted, then arguably, so too do (straying) European values, some of which may 
be designated Eurocentric. Another thread, related to the first, concerns the current 
hostility on the part of Australian authorities, the newly emerged right-wing One 
Nation party, and many Australian citizens, to those (non-euro) ‘stray aliens’ who 
occasionally make it to Australian shores. Some stray aliens are less acceptable here 
than others. 
 
Prompted by the editorial error noted above, this paper appears as a conversation 
about Eurocentrism between five participants, all of whom work in European studies 
as teachers and researchers in Australia, the place of ‘stray aliens’. The dialogue 
proceeded cumulatively in August 2001, with responses circulating between 
contributors in e-mail form. Our aim was to dislocate the debate about ‘Europe’, and 
hence about those discourses gathered under the eurocentric rubric, away from the 
eurocentre to one of Europe’s blind spots, Australia. Emerging in the debate is a 
strong sense of the ways in which power and privilege inevitably accrue centrifugally. 
As a bid toward resistant practice, our local Australian, even Sydneyside, perspective 
is here foregrounded. While we provide some translation of the antipodean locales 
mentioned along the way, we have refrained self-consciously from explaining every 
local reference, and since this paper represents the end-point of an informal 
discussion, we have refrained from formalising its self-reflective, dialogic, and open-
ended character. 
 
After Israel, Australia has the highest percentage of first and second-generation 
migrants of any nation-state. It is routinely described as one of the world’s 
multicultural success stories. This success, however, does not translate to the nation’s 
indigenous peoples, and nor does it offer solace to the (very few) thousands of 
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refugees who attempt to reach the nation’s northern coastline. Indeed, the rhetoric of 
alien swamping with which the current Liberal government responds to such arrivals, 
as well as its practice of housing them in detention centres far from major urban 
centres, suggest that multiculturalism has done little to diminish a long-standing social 
imaginary that Australia is in danger of being overrun by people from the Asian north. 
Until 1973, this fear underwrote the official White Australia Policy, by which non-
European migration was actively discouraged. It also informed the rhetoric of ‘the 
Yellow Peril’, the yellow people in question describing first, the Japanese in the 
period leading up to and including World War II, second, the South-east Asian 
communist regimes of the post-war period, and third, the refugees (boat people) from 
the Cold War conflicts in South-east Asia, conflicts in which Australia supplied 
troops in support of U.S. efforts. Before the post-1945 mass migrations from Europe 
and elsewhere transformed the Australian social imagination away from faith in a 
securely British-dominated world, most Australians regarded Britain as the true 
cultural home. Since the 1970s, however, home has shifted. Europe is likely to signify 
Italy, Greece, Malta, or parts of the former Yugoslavia, as well as Britain. Moreover, 
recent national identity debates reflect Australia’s uneasily articulated desire to 
redefine its geo-political and cultural place at the south-eastern tip of Asia, or at the 
south-western edge of the U.S-dominated Pacific region, as opposed to the old, but 
resilient, notion that Australia signifies Europe transported. This sketch, of course, is 
cursory and partial, but it does provide a frame for the straying concerns of the 
following conversation.  
 
7 August 2001: Maja 
Still fresh from last week’s conference ‘The Nation is my Thing’, which included two 
papers by cultural theorist Slavoj Zizek,1 I would like to respond with the following 
threads, the self-proclaimed brainchildren of the thought-provoking Slovene. First, I 
would like to take up Zizek’s (1998) consciously universalising and politically 
mobilising reading of Eurocentrism as a potential form of resistance, embedded in the 
European tradition, to globalisation. As an avenue for political action in the era of 
global liberal capitalism, Zizek’s Eurocentrism potentially allows the ‘nonpart’ (that 
part of society with no defined place, or which resists its allocated subordination) to 
elevate its own destiny and present it as universal. Zizek’s rehabilitative reading of 
Eurocentrism may be interpreted as an attempt to salvage this overused and abused 
word from its possible destiny as a theoretical cliché, as well as an enactment of his 
proposed political strategy, of which the tension between the particular and the 
universal is a conditio sine qua non. Now, back to Australia. For Zizek, so called 
‘tolerant liberal multiculturalism’, a manifestation of today’s postpolitical world that 
thwarts the positive potential of articulating universality, necessarily creates its direct 
opposite in the excessive intolerance and violence of new fundamentalist groups, of 
which One Nation is a current example. In other words, Howard’s ‘average stray 
aliens’ are not alien to contemporary Australian society, but are in fact a product of 
that society. 
 
With regard to the suggestion that some stray aliens (the refugees reaching Australian 
shores) are less acceptable than others for the Australian public imaginary, consider 
the case of eighty Kosovar refugees who in June 1999 refused to enter the Singleton 
                                                 
1 The conference, which took place in Sydney on 3-4 August, 2001, was hosted by the Division of 
Society, Culture, Media and Philosophy at Macquarie University and the Research Institute for 
Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sydney. 
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army barracks in the Hunter Valley, claiming that the conditions in this ‘Safe Haven’ 
were not suitable for a lengthy stay. Their concerns were confirmed by U.N. 
inspectors, who described the barracks as frightening, inappropriate and insecure. 
From the outset, the media sought to construct a clear border between ‘us’ (liberal, 
rational, tolerant and charitable westerners) and ‘them’ (the needy and often 
infantilised objects of our charity). By staging their three-day sit-in on the buses that 
had transported them to the barracks, the Kosovars blurred this border by asserting 
themselves as potentially equal subjects. The media border control, whose tone 
immediately lapsed into hostility and undisguised orientalism, became almost violent, 
focusing exclusively on the Kosovars’ supposed backwardness, unruliness, and lack 
of hygiene. Zizek would probably say that the ‘only good alien is a dead alien’, that 
is, one separated from her or his right to jouissance and thus prevented from claiming 
a position of equality in the debate.2 
 
9 August 2001: Murray 
Prompted by lecturing on the Contemporary Europe subject, and my encounters with 
Babylonians in ‘Civilization II’, I’ve been wondering how much sense ‘Eurocentrism’ 
makes. It would seem that the etymology of Europe is traceable to Akkadian sailors, 
and their designation of the twilight coast to the West as erebu. In what sense, then, 
can the West be a centre? Were Eurocentric to be regarded as a personal rather than 
(supra-)national designation, it would have to be regarded as eccentric. Europe 
actually has an odd myth of origin, one where the sense of a chosen people is 
tempered by displacement: the delectable virgin Europa carried off to Crete on the 
back of Zeus (a great white bull). Not a story too familiar to the average European, I 
would guess, but one with the requisite components of union, privilege, and 
differentiation, yet also of an originary decentering. 
 
For practical purposes, however, euroland offers a different story about beginnings, 
the often told tale of a continent torn apart by two world wars but vowing a hollow 
‘never again’, and with a second Zeus coming to its aid in the form of a great white 
Marshall Plan, from whence came Coal & Steel agreements, monthly sittings in 
Strasbourg, and the slight inconveniences of minor realignments at the Eastern 
margins (what price the re-ethnicisation of nations to meet the privileged standards of 
membership?). Yet this story doesn’t stick: its school promotion literature conjures up 
Erasmus in the shape of a nomad, the originary free-movement scholar; while some 
entrepreneurial Austrians are bottling the scent of old banknotes as a way of selling 
authenticity for its new currency. 
 
From Sydney there seem to me to be many Europes: the Mediterranean homelands of 
new generations of many ‘stray aliens’ re-inflecting the English inherited from 
previous migrants; my own eccentric stray Europeanism where coasts are always on 
the West, suns set behind Ailsa Craig, and there is one kind of football only; the 
imagined exotic of our students en route for Konstanz, Caen, Barcelona and Bologna; 
and the world of the ‘smeg’ appliance and European ‘cachet’. Insidious Europes of 
displacement all. Perhaps the official myth of origin (of choice), ambivalent about the 
colonising processes that have resulted in the lights going out and the saving grace of 
the deus ex machina ‘outre-Atlantique’, is a useful gloss after all (is useful for what it 
                                                 
2 I am referring to one of Zizek’s presentations at the above conference, entitled ‘The Only Good 
Neighbour is a Dead Neighbour: or a Deadlock of Multiculturalist Tolerance’. 
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glosses over). Europe is decentered, out of kilter, unification a byproduct of its orbit 
around its others, including the new Bushian Europe against whose simultaneous pull 
and othering Europe gets marshalled into definition. The question here, then, is to 
what extent the U.S.A actually requires a grand-narrative genealogy derived from 
Europe and a eurocentred vision? 
 
August 13 2001: Adam 
It seems to me that the idea of Europe has a lot of symbolic power, but it symbolises 
very different things to different people. Europe can embody the worst excesses of 
colonialism, as well as a culturally diverse and refreshing alternative to pax 
Americana. It is an object of desire as well as one of derision: desired by the likes of 
us ‘stray aliens’ and others who inherited the history and culture of the place, but lack 
the context or landscape to put it in; and derided by neo-nationalists and eurosceptics 
as a bureaucracy gone mad and a threat to cultural identity. The notion of Europe is 
slippery, imagined. The Europe gazed at by an Algerian looking north across the 
Mediterranean is not the same as that in which a French person stands to look south. 
Geographically, politically, culturally, economically and psychologically, the borders 
of Europe are changing; indeed, there never were clear borders anyway. Turkey might 
be European geographically, but it isn’t (yet) politically, and certainly hasn’t been for 
a long time historically. One could argue that Australia is European culturally, but not 
geographically or politically. England doesn’t want to be in Europe, but it doesn’t 
want to abandon Europe either. ‘Europe’ is enigmatic precisely because it doesn’t 
exist. It signifies liberation (the enlightenment) and oppression (colonialism), wealth 
(Monaco) and poverty (Albania), diversity and monopoly, and opportunity and 
disadvantage.  
 
Europe has the possibility of giving small cultures a greater political voice. It is a 
chance for the Bretons, Catalans, Sami and others to be represented, not as minorities, 
but as members of a system where no single culture or nation dominates. But the 
concept of a Europe is also a spurious unifying force used by governments and 
corporations to legitimate the exclusion of non-Europeans: a tool for the protection of 
capital, economic and cultural, from the ghastly hoards of the South. The borders of 
this Europe are culturally arbitrary and designed to keep the money flowing whilst 
protecting the privilege of those within. In this Europe, the protection of culture or of 
cultural tradition is used as an ugly alibi for the continued exploitation of the South 
and the perpetuation of political and economic inequity. 
 
So what does this mean for Eurocentrism? In some ways it is inevitable for me to be 
eurocentric: I come from a European background, live in a society based on European 
principles, speak a European language. But before I can begin to think about this, I 
must understand what Eurocentrism means. So the question is not are we or am I 
eurocentric, but what is Eurocentrism, or what does it mean to be eurocentric, or how 
can we achieve a Eurocentrism that is just? Since the notion of Eurocentrism is far 
from fixed and the symbolic role of Europe is contested, we must ensure that critiques 
of Eurocentrism engage debates about social justice, cultural diversity and mutual 
respect as well as about history, politics and economics. 
 
August 14 2001: Yixu 
When I spent my formative years being educated in Germany in the 1980s, there 
seemed to be an unwritten rule that well-educated Germans called themselves 
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Mitteleuropäer, not Germans. Curious about this, I was told that the time of 
nationalism was now over and that Germans, because of their history in the first half 
of the twentieth century, should be more cautious about, or preferably avoid, using 
words such as ‘fatherland’, ‘patriotism’, and ‘Germany’. I was given to understand 
that I should appreciate this as a sign of progress; Germans could now term 
themselves Europeans, and not, in the first instance, Germans. For the majority of the 
educated classes in Germany at that time, nationalism was linked to a dark episode in 
history that must never be repeated. 
 
When I left Germany in the early 1990s, houses of Turkish migrants and asylum-
seekers were in flames, Jewish cemeteries were being desecrated, and people with an 
Asian appearance were being abused, especially in the former G.D.R. There were 
violent clashes between neo-fascist demonstrators and their anti-fascist opponents. 
Talk about a united Europe and Germans as good Europeans seemed to have little 
impact on a renascent German-centrism which made no secret of its overriding 
intention to exclude ‘stray aliens’ from Germany.  
 
To me this contradictory, and very personal, experience of Germany could serve as a 
model for a more general experience of Europe. The continent, with its many 
contradictions, is trying to learn from its past, to make the best of its future. We don’t 
know where history will ultimately lead European peoples, and it is hard to judge 
their ambitious endeavour to unite Europe. The past of many major cultures tells us, 
the creation of a new political entity inevitably means the exclusion of the Other, from 
the chosen formula. Nevertheless, for me Europe is a reality, not a mere symbol. Nor 
is it merely enigmatic. The history of Europe is real: subsequent interpretations of it 
will clash, and some will be wrong. If Europeans concentrate on themselves and call 
this attitude Eurocentrism, there is nothing inherently praiseworthy or reprehensible in 
the process. Such attitudes are found everywhere. The news about Australian sporting 
events and local politics takes more time than the world news in the thirty-minute 
bulletins on our national television. If the respectable SBS didn’t exist, it would be 
much harder for Australians, who experience the world predominantly through the 
media, to imagine that continents such as South America or Africa exist at all, except 
as film-sets for disaster-movies.  
 
However, if European scholars or media people believe that self-assertion is 
something uniquely European, thus differentiating them from the rest of the world, 
then that would be both arrogant and megalomanic. Eurocentrism as a concept or an 
etiquette, a popularly acceptable mode of discourse, could serve many purposes, some 
fundamentally different from others. Like the discourses about a united Europe, it 
could serve as an ideal to counter nationalism and express critical reflection; it could 
also become the ideology of an elite club that could consciously exclude other 
societies by claiming precisely their lack of some kind of centrism.  
 
August 15 2001: Murray 
‘Departure. Arrival. Adaptation. Fusion’. 
No matter how much I told myself I wasn’t supposed to be working at the Nitin 
Sawhney gig on Tuesday night (‘Don’t be afraid of letting go’), the sequence flashing 
up on the giant screen during one track, entitled ‘The Immigrant’, from Sawhney’s 
Beyond Skin, just kept telling me otherwise. Interspersed with shots of coloured 
balloons bobbing up and down over the barbed wire of a detention camp, the recipe 
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for a new, transversal perception of social movement characterised the evening: 
singers and rhythms from Latino, South Asian, Afro-Caribbean and European 
heritages; the ‘call to prayer’ that set the meditation on sound in motion; and 
Sawhney’s own Anglo-Indian slant on the politics and noise of the global, his 
engagement with Mandela; and Sydney’s Enmore Theatre packed to its art deco 
rafters with all the usual ethnic-and-other eclecticism of Newtown fauna. All things 
conspired to nag away at a eurocentric idea. Maybe it’s time for the ‘G-word’: 
globalisation. 
 
In common with other ‘net major contributors’ to euroland (France and Germany), 
and with the nascent sleeping-giant, white-dwarf, bubbling-under economies (or 
whatever metaphors that the Newsweeks of the world choose to run with this week) 
that are (Northern) Italy and (Catalan) Spain, Euro-imaginings of national identity still 
think in colonies. In opposition to the bloc mentality propagandised by CNN 
(measuring the world to businessmen in variously rated hotel rooms, ticking over 
synchro-timezones in the only English that counts), that is, of regions with their 
notional egality of participant economies (rather than states, far less countries), the 
logics and organisations of the global have no bounds. Colonial nodes of connection 
that brought tea to Guildford and couscous to Poitiers are now reconfigured, overlaid 
with the fusions of the ethnotourist, and, mea culpa, world music. What globalisations 
are there? Where and how can we find value among them, and whose values? It was 
only a thought, and it was a thought when the only real ‘eu’ on my mind was ‘phoric’. 
Bloc proliferations, such as the New Europe, offer the inherent centrism of any 
hegemony. Or perhaps not ‘any’, but that of the originary united states, the 
paradigmatic blocism that makes the U.S.A. as globally ubiquitous in power-
economics as it is with its chains of dead-cow restaurants.  
 
A new nodalism, in other words, beneath the commonalities, with the land of the 
rising euro as guilty as any other, centripetally conceptualised in currencies, trade 
winds, and language bloc(k)s. I’m talking about the U.S.A., not Europe. And for all 
that any real ‘America’ exists, it is much less of a monolith than I’m suggesting, 
despite being so shrink-wrapped within its own problematically defensible borders. 
Yet let us posit forms of fusion against the suffusion of the melting-pot: migrations as 
exchanges and dialogues rather than appropriation; perhaps a euromodel of 
interlearnings through difference, a revalorisation of the global as surprising crossings 
of the local. While cities such as Sydney champion a multicultural bouillebaisse, these 
global theme-parks do little more than affirm the protean dominance of the West. But 
there are other ways to conceive of fusion, that is, as the sense that world citizenship 
is not organised hierarchically, and that since no continent exists in isolation, 
questioning our shared responsibility for the present happens as a matter of course. 
 
The taxi-driver was Bengali. Australian Bengali. The music was awful. Australian. I 
noticed something or other technological that may have been a CD player. What 
negotiation took place? What was it about? It didn’t and doesn’t matter. I am not 
(only) white, European, American. ‘Sunset’, the first track of Sawnhey’s Prophesy 
plays. $25, 5 minutes before. Quietly at first, but the driver has one of these wheel 
control things. (‘People are starting to ask for less technology’.) Then louder. Smiles. 
Laughs. ‘Do you understand the language he’s singing in?’ One of us did. 
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August 17 2001: Adam 
An interesting exercise was undertaken a couple of years back in a European 
newspaper. The goal was to find the stereotypical European, a European Paul Hogan, 
someone whose appearance and behaviour would personify the new community. 
After months of looking came the admission of defeat. They could not find the typical 
European, ostensibly because no stereotype satisfied the pan-European brief. It was 
perhaps possible to envisage the typical Scot, or Spaniard or Italian, but there was no 
unifying character to which everyone in Europe could relate and identify.  
 
It is a truism that stereotypes do not exist. They are caricatures used to identify both 
similarities and differences between groups of individuals, simplistic renderings of 
cultural traits that have social and political purposes. But if we see stereotypes as 
focal points for constructing social identities, measuring sticks for individuals to 
assess their position (Austalianness, Englishness, or Europeanness) in a cultural 
system, then what does this mean for Europe? Is there no typical European simply 
because the notion of Europe is artificial and false, or is the concept of a culturally 
united Europe is still too new? Do people need more time to identify and represent the 
similarities they share with each other? Stereotypes assert similarities within and 
differences between groups. Perhaps Europe is still in the process of focussing on the 
differences between states and not on the similarities of the Union. 
 
However, in these questions a third possibility emerges, that of seeing personal and 
social identity as strategic, not fixed. I recently asked a French national with Breton 
ancestry whether she felt herself more French than Breton or more Breton than 
French. She replied ‘I am Breton first, European second and French third’. This 
surprised me. To me she seemed very ‘French’, but her attitude suggested that she 
saw Europe as an umbrella for a union of smaller cultural groups that were very post-
national, or possibly neo-national, in nature. Her comment suggested she was willing 
and able to slip between Breton, French, or European as she required, and yet be all 
three at the same time. She did not have to give one up in order to be the other; she 
chose her identity strategically.  
 
Would this have been possible without Europe, if the only choice was between Breton 
or French? In the past it has been rare for people to feel comfortable locating 
themselves in more than one culture (for example, Said’s struggle with identity in 
exile) and rarer still for nations to tolerate identity differences within their borders. In 
a sense ‘Europe’ facilitates a plurality of social identities, precisely because it is free 
(or freer) from ‘unifying’ social stereotypes and the overarching desire for cultural 
‘normality’. Being European is about choosing strategic alliances with others based 
not on social stereotypes or common cultural traits (not even religion or language) but 
on pragmatic opportunity or necessity. Perhaps this is a consequence of a bloc-ism 
based on a perceived economic response to the U.S.A.’s economic dominance. The 
fact remains, however, that on a community level the sense of Europe gives people 
another means for articulating an identity based on something other than nationalism. 
The slipperiness of European identity opens up possibilities for enabling new forms of 
community. Europe also offers an opportunity for creating a space where smaller 
communities, old and new, can be represented in an environment where ideas of 




August 21 2001: Yixu 
Post-1945 Europeanism, as a positive but ‘wholesome’ ideology, can be seen as an 
attempt to revalidate the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment in eighteenth century 
Europe, that is, a ‘free’ choice of cultural identity is offered, but the ultimate privilege 
is given to none. The German intelligentsia in the late eighteenth century was eager to 
embrace cosmopolitanism, since a German cultural national identity had yet to 
achieve currency and credibility. To endorse universal cultural and intellectual 
citizenship was a convenient way of repudiating and evading the obvious dominance 
of Diderot and Voltaire, and their lesser compatriots. Therefore, prior to the upsurge 
of nationalism during and after the wars against Napoleon, and in the aftermath of the 
Congress of Vienna, cosmopolitanism became for German intellectuals a mode of 
demonstrating the best of all possible intentions toward fellow ‘civilised’ societies. At 
the same time cosmopolitanism left one’s own relationship to the stars of the French 
Enlightenment conveniently undefined, thus implying a refusal to kowtow to them.  
 
In the twentieth century, when national dreams had turned into nightmares or 
hangovers that needed repudiating, a wholesome Europeanism became once more like 
the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment; that is, a way out of fixing identity too 
narrowly in relation to any dominant national culture. Problematically, such 
Europeanism still carries the ballast of nineteenth-century colonialism and thus of the 
exploitation of countless indigenous peoples by Europeans with allegiances to French, 
Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, German and, above all, British culture. The ballast 
includes the wholesale destruction, consciously or by assimilation, of the cultures of 
these indigenous peoples. This guilt cannot be glossed over, for as long as it is 
accepted as guilt.3 But the liberation movements in former colonies and the 
devastating eloquence of writers such as Fanon mean that there is no easy way for 
Europeans to resurrect Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. Whole-food Europeanism 
can slide into junk-food Eurocentrism: it depends on whether you get it at McDonalds 
or what the Germans call a Reformhaus, actually nothing more threatening than a 
whole-food shop. The integrity of the ingredients is all. 
 
Eurocentrism will remain a suspect ideology until the collective guilt of destructive 
nationalist-inspired wars, the legacy of the murder of the Jews, Sinti and Roma, and 
Jehovah’s witnesses in Germany, and the colonial maceration of indigenous cultures 
outside Europe, are sufficiently forgotten to no longer matter. In the meantime, the 
slide of well-meaning ‘Europeanism’ (posed as an antidote to Balkan nationalisms) 
into a snide Eurocentrism will always be on the cards. Indeed, it will be taken up in 
polemics and propaganda for as long as there is a way of re-actualising the unpurged 
guilt of nineteenth century colonialism and destructive twentieth century nationalist 
and class ideologies. 
 
August 22 2001: Paul 
‘Euro-ness’ is sometimes manifested as a celebration or appeal to hybridity as 
differences in productive cultural contact, as non-essentialist heterogeneity. Robert 
Young (1995: 2-4) points out, however, that the discourse of hybridity emerged within 
the interwoven histories and discourses of European imperialism, colonisation, 
slavery, economic and civilising progress, commodity manufacture, agricultural 
                                                 
3 Chinese cultural centrism was, by the way, superbly immune to guilt, indeed to the least nostalgia for 
the indigenous cultures it ate up over the centuries. 
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modernisation, evolutionary eugenics, and racial taxonomies. Nonetheless, while 
Young suggests that contemporary uses of hybridity as a cultural signifier might not 
have escaped the term’s resilient racist and eugenic past, he also betrays his own euro-
blindspot. Describing himself standing at Greenwich, Young claims to inhabit both 
east and west because ‘the Longitude Zero, the centre of the world, has become . . . 
suffused with the pulse of difference’, populated by peoples ‘whose ancestors hark 
back to the Caribbean and Africa, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh’ and so on. This is an 
unarguable rejoinder to tired appeals to euro-purity. However, in Young’s hybrid 
revision of Englishness, there is no recognition that the straying peoples he speaks of 
might not experience life as he does around the Meridian, itself proof of an ex-
imperial centre’s persisting epistemological control over the world beyond it. Young’s 
(non-straying) hybrid Englishness, untroubled by race, class, gender-sex, generational, 
linguistic or regional differentials, defines a late twentieth century, postmodernist and 
euro-centred hybrid everywhere. Grey, damp, middle-powered London becomes the 
paradigmatic endpoint of a trajectory that includes the way-stations of imperial 
expansion, industrialisation, colonization, decolonisation, transnational capitalism, and 
finally cultural hybridisation, a happy culmination and recuperation indeed.  
 
Returning to the place of ‘average stray aliens’, the Tasmanian Aboriginal Ian 
Anderson (1993-94: 10-11) has something to say about hybridity discourse: ‘I am no 
hybrid. I am a muttonbird Koori’. This claim forcefully brings to the fore the liabilities 
of a term in the service of ‘assimilation-colonialism’. Hybridity signifies a body 
signed by Europe as ‘doomed to disappear’ because of racial and cultural admixture, 
and by implication, inferiority. Anderson’s stand influenced the cultural theorist 
Suvendrini Perera (1994: 19) to make her stand against the ‘happy hybrid’ syndrome 
of Australian culture. For Perera an Anglo-Celtic/antipodean hybridity (euro-ness and 
whiteness displaced; an ‘uncontaminated, asexual and non-native hybridity’) is 
socially laudable, while the Aboriginal-European, mixed-race hybrid is denied, 
punished or simply not countenanced in post-colonial, post-euro Australia. 
 
Eurocentrism is alive and well as an inherited epistemological hold on our own 
straying histories and relationships. It is as unarguable as the Greenwich Meridian, 
proof sterling that the world is rated in and from euroland, even the British part of it 
ambivalent about its euro-ness. Eurocentrism means that an Australian can arrive in 
London (Paris, Rome, or Greece) and be told time and again that there is no history 
but that which is on superficial display around the stray alien (the acceptable one, that 
is). Eurocentrism is to recognise with a jolt as one navigates around the landmarks of 
euro-history that Europe’s main cities are as familiar to us as our own cities. It is to 
learn how euro-ness exists in many of us as a somatic sign that enables us to slip 
unnoticed into euro-streets, until our accent betrays us.  
 
And as a response to such manifestations of euro-power counter-narratives emerge 
from us, uneasily and anxiously. We feel anger about, not solace in, the fact that a 
little island on the other side of the world determines how our speech patterns are 
valued, what names our writers have to live up to, who our head of state is: European. 
In our trips of self-discovery back to euroland some of us are taken aback by the 
pervasive drabness of expectation we see around us. We note that the stultifying hold 
of tired social niceties, oppressive kinship networks, and toffee-mouthed, inbred 
aristocracies never translated to the antipodes. We find the local cuisines wanting (our 
South-east Asian modulated palates unsatisfied), and we begin to suffer from a 
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claustrophobia brought on by low skies and the impossibility of finding a space large 
enough in which to lose ourselves. Indeed, we come to understand why so many 
millions of euro-men and women took advantage of colonial projects and decamped 
for more hopeful and spacious elsewheres, blithely untroubled by who and what they 
might displace in the process, forever more unable to decide whether or not history is 
to be shared between place of origin and destination. 
 
The participants in this discussion teach and research on Europe. As befits a typical 
‘stray alien’ profile, four of us were born outside Australia, three in Europe, one in 
China, and the fifth is a third-generation citizen. Some of us enjoy access to two 
passports. We are surprised when our students approach Europe as an exotic 
destination, a decidedly not-Australia, as little more than a richly filled space in which 
they expect to encounter such pleasant authenticities as la corrida, German pilsner, 
and Mediterranean ‘passion’. But despite our own personal straying from euroland, is 
it possible that we have sidestepped the ways by which euroland informs our academic 
location? Do we still require Zizek to tell us that politics is a euro-concept (all hail the 
classical Greeks, our unstraying fathers) and do we need to hear that (euro)-
universalism is really not a dirty word? Do we continue to seek consolation in 
‘mastering’ the words of euro-god-thinkers (Weber and Derrida, Plato and Foucault, 
Deleuze and Guatari, and the hero-men of the euro-Enlightenment) whose 
epistemologically heavy reputations (in translation) arrive on our shores? Are we 
impelled to defer to euro-author functions when articulating our own geocultural 
(dis)location or conducting the academic work that we think is interesting and/or 
important? Do we reside and work in a perpetual (euro-)state of citational anxiety? 
Are we happy to shift our attention from imaginary and historical-material euroland to 
the equally imaginary and historical-material U.S.A in an age of contested 
globalisation, only to find that in the process we have rescued and redeemed euroland 
and euro-ness? Are we average stray (euro-)aliens after all? 
 
August 24 2001: Murray 
This is a tale of two Germaines. First Ms Greer (Henderson 2000), and her declaration 
in the first weeks of the third millenium that ‘I am an honorary Aborigine’ (pace 
JFK). Her comments were widely perceived as hyperbole, but Greer (Ellinsen 2001) 
nonetheless contextualised them as a particular and local defusion of the hyperreality 
of Australian debates over Aboriginal issues. She attacks reconciliation, that which 
‘reconciles’ Aborigines to their fate, and comes out as pro-treaty. She regards modern 
Australia as an ongoing whitewash of indigenous cultures, the positing of a unitary 
ethnicity at the expense of diverse tribal traditions. She lambasts the inflations of the 
art world as a market-induced cover-up that blanks out the black in the pictorial 
background. Modern Australia, she says, signifies a practical, successful and silent 
apartheid, one that, it is no paradox, her status in exile allows her to address, yet never 
as an Aborigine.  
 
Nonetheless, Greer (Henderson 2000) has also advocated Aboriginality as a more 
appropriate model for being Australian, and for managing the resource base of the 
country, than the Anglo-American models of official governance. The processes 
through which Greer’s articulation is made are as interesting as their content. Her 
controversial ‘adoption’ by Aboriginal women in Fitzroy, far from cultural 
appropriation, turns out to be a nomadic and uncomplicated acknowledgement, made 
in a café, of her entry into dialogue. If ‘the whole point is that all Australians could be 
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Aborigines’, then this does something very interesting to our thinking on centricity 
per se. The competing, disappearing and impossible Europes that our discussion has 
imagined, offer more than a peripheral repetition or recentering around ‘Western’ 
values. Call me a geographical determinist, but Australia can never be meaningfully 
Western. More than this, what does the stray alien status we’ve been working with for 
the last few weeks mean if not something similar to what Greer is saying, in particular 
her implication that there are few Australians who are not, in a sense, here through 
nomadism and struggle: ‘And the thought of these people who themselves had been 
driven off their crofts into Scotland and off their farms in the west country, and my 
Swiss ancestor being sold out by his brothers and sisters and sent off to die on the 
goldfields, and so on and so forth’. 
 
This brings me to Germaine Lemaire, the leading author and national figure in 
Nathalie Sarraute’s The Planetarium (1959). Lemaire, like the other poles of 
consciousness in this experimental novel, functions metaphorically as a planet around 
which other satellite consciousnesses revolve, herself vectored into a wider solar 
system, universe, macromodel. The relativism of Sarraute’s tropistic approach 
challenges both the primacy of the centre and its possibility. And yet this is only a 
novel, a planetarium, a mock-up, reassuringly fixed in its simulation of always 
teetering relational systems of attraction and repulsion.  
 
I’d like to stress the eccentricity of orbit that links, perhaps, the two Germaines. That 
eccentricity represents the entropies, deviant quarks, what the hell ‘différances’ that 
our e-dialogue is generating, always already at work and play in any grand 
narrativisation of our world (as European), or indeed of its disruption (as the critique 
of Eurocentrism). We’ve kicked around the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘Eurocentrism’, 
sometimes meeting, sometimes straying offcourse, alienated in Australia, adopting 
and adapting as we go, the local as valid as the central. 
 
25 August 2001: Maja 
As this string of thoughts develops, we can read it as a mosaic of autobiographical 
allusions underlying our particular preoccupations, approaches and the ways of 
communicating them to the rest of the group. As a ‘stray alien’ originally from the 
obscure orientalised ‘orbits’ of the European planetarium, I am tempted to regard 
topical Eurocentrism debates as funerary discourses, encomia or invectives, 
surrounding the passage of a European ‘core’ of fifteen towards a future enlarged 
Europe of twenty-seven or more. Since the 1980s, Orientalism has been a dirty word 
inseparable from Eurocentrism (Said 1979). Europeanness has been seen as defining 
itself in opposition to the Orient: Rome against Constantinople; crusaders against the 
Infidel; the Holy Roman Empire against Byzantium; post-Westphalian Europe against 
the Ottoman Empire; the Marshall Plan Empyrean against the Stalinist Malebolge; 
European unity against Balkan discord. In support of their right to membership of the 
EU, the traditionally orientalised aspirant countries now often embrace westcentric 
rhetoric and point their finger at the ‘true orientals’ waiting with them to cross the 
European Lethe.  
 
Turkey, the heir of the ‘sick man of Europe’, holds a record in waiting for the doors to 
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open.4 We may recall that, in his proposal for a peaceful and stable European society 
of states written three centuries ago, the English Quaker William Penn suggested that 
the Ottoman Empire be included only if it rejected Islam as its official religion 
(Neumann 1998: 51). The long waiting period Turkey is experiencing today is 
officially explained in terms of the country’s disputed adherence to liberal democratic 
principles, as reflected in its treatment of the Kurdish minority and in the political role 
of the armed forces. Under the surface, however, religion still underpins people’s 
imagining of Europeanness. If or when admitted into the Union, Turkey (66 million) 
would become the second most populous member after Germany, with remarkable 
voting power. Tacit fears that the current Turkish pro-European secularism might be 
supplanted by militant nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism go against the grain 
of the rhetoric of reason that Europe wants to extol. And what about other candidate 
countries? While their new governments may preach and practice democracy, and 
expend great amounts of energy in dismantling the former Eastern European 
geopolitical mythology and relocating themselves from the orbits into the heart of 
Europe (Zlata Praha!), their efforts are often met with invisible walls and curtains. 
 
But, things are changing. Borders are shifting. Eurocentrism is yielding more and 
more of its self-defined semantic terrain, shedding the self-imposed straightjacket that 
had been foreclosing its potential discursive horizons. It has recognised itself as an 
empty sign, which can at best signify its own erasure or perhaps, as Taoists would 
have it, seek empowerment in ‘that which is not’. The iconography of the European 
Union fittingly embodies both this erasure and potential empowerment: a blue board 
with a crown of yellow stars, waiting to proliferate with each new member. Unlike the 
earlier emblems loaded with religious and political symbolism, the current design 
almost invites us to project our own meanings of Europe onto it. The hopefuls in the 
waiting room are painting new stars; the integrationists are consolidating defences; 
the globalisers are constructing galaxies. 
 
In her own vision of hybridity, Dubravka Ugresic (1999: 250) sees hope for the new 
Europe in a new generation of Europeans, born from a love affair between the East 
and the West, the ‘nomads, bastards, wossies . . . those who unite in themselves the 
traumatic Wessie and Ossie genes’. I myself am such a hybrid. In Brussels or 
Amsterdam, I would (still) be a ‘sub-tenant’. Down Under, I am free to feel (if I so 
desire) and likely to be interpreted as, fully and unmistakenly European, yet more 
proof that Europeanness asserts itself only through dislocation. 
 
23 August 2001: Adam 
What is Eurocentrism and how does it differ from postcolonialism, westernisation, and 
globalisation? Europe was built on ideas of privilege and power and the need to 
legitimise the inequity this produces and continues to reproduce. Yet Europe 
represents, idealistically perhaps, a way of circumventing nationalism, at least until 
such time as Europe becomes itself a nation. The difficulty with understanding 
Eurocentrism derives from the term’s discursive ambiguity, its shifts between an 
historical sense of orientalism and colonialism, an economic sense of capitalism, a 
political sense of nation, and a personal and communal sense of identity. Eurocentrism 
is not one idea but many applied selectively and strategically in a number of contexts 
                                                 
4 The metaphor of the Ottoman Empire as Europe’s “sick man” was coined by the Russian Tsar 
Nicholas I in 1983 (Neumann 1998: 55). Turkey signed an association agreement with the then EEC in 
1963; it formally applied for membership in 1987. 
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to express, legitimate, explain, and represent a shifting tension between inclusion and 
exclusion.  
 
24 August 2001: Yixu 
A discourse about Eurocentrism conducted by European scholars in Europe would be 
differently centred, with different external points of reference than those in our 
ambivalent conversation. We try to adopt an external, critical stance to something we 
have internalised in more than one mode of discourse, if only by a process of 
overlapping ‘as if’s’. If we speak as ‘Europeans’ from an Australian perspective, then 
we are Eurocentric for want of our own centre. We look at Europe and its 
cultural/linguistic egocentricity from a position ‘outside’, but centered nowhere. A 
criticism of Eurocentrism from that decentered Australian cultural margin of both 
Europe and Asia, falls between a self-criticism from outside an identifiably centred 
self and a hesitant half-acceptance of Australia’s colonising and colonised past. 
 
I would like to end with Kafka’s discussion (1946: 99) of Prometheus: ‘fatigue set in 
concerning a myth that had lost its basis. The gods got tired; the eagles got tired; 
Prometheus’s wound closed in weariness. There remained the inexplicable cliff. The 
myth tries to explain the inexplicable. Since it arises from a basis in truth it must end 
once more in the inexplicable’. Could this be a model for Eurocentrism? 
 
28 August 2001: Paul 
Colonisation in Australia was and remains a Euro-fact. The current population is 
atoning for this fact, and rightly so, but it concerns me that the relocation of this 
process to Australia “only” reprieves Europe from confronting its past. As it sits atop 
of a changing (to me, explicable) demographic cliff on the other side of the world, is 
Europe kidding itself that history has absolved it from the legacies of colonialism?  
 
28 August 2001: Murray 
An inexplicable (Kafkaesque) cliff? Is this where we end up? Captain Euro to the 
rescue, perhaps. The currency-friendly superhero now promoting that most tangible 
form of Eurocentrism, and zapping his way across the www-waves 
(www.captaineuro.com), will surely save the day. Frame one: the world in clouds, the 
sun shines on Europe, and (no joke) a hurricane brews over Turkey: ‘As the 21st 
century dawns the world is changing more rapidly than ever before. The old 
structures are disappearing as new ones take their place, bringing with them 
uncertainty for the future’. Frame two: a mysterious light emanates from Brussels: ‘In 
this climate of constant change the European Union, a union of prosperity and 
innovation has emerged as a global superpower. The twelve stars organisation has 
been set up to defend the security of Europe and uphold the values of the union’.  
 
Perhaps more than a metamorphosis, we end up on the same old originary myth of 
pan-Europe. Episode 1 of the good captain’s adventures draws together strands from 
the frozen Baltic, sunbaked Greek Islands, and giant caves in Majorca, to explain the 
super-European force that transforms plain Adam Andros into a comic-book hero 
capable of combating the evil powers of Dr. D. Vider. The message of unity in 
diversity is conveyed in graphic terms, with a deconstructive twist: the runic text of 
the stone tablet hits the deck of a Viking vessel and smashes into twelve little stars. 
The euro-goodies’ comments (‘Thousands of years of history smashed’, ‘No it looks 
like it was meant to break like that’), like the federal future that represent 
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Eurocentrism’s logical endgame, give the lie to any hope of progress on the real 
issues of global responsibility and realignment that this dialogue has raised.  
 
As we bring our discussion to a close, and prepare to courtier our thoughts back to a 
now questionable motherland, events conspire to remind us of the damage that 
Eurocentric visions continue to wreak here in fortress Australia. Another Viking 
vessel, the Norwegian-registered ‘Tampa’, carrying more than 400 rescued refugees 
from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, was stormed by the Australian SAS, with 
the government refusing to grant permission to the ship to dock in Australian territory, 
a direct contravention of international law. The fate of those on board is uncertain. 
How different a story this would have made if the passengers had come from the 
place of nicely smashed gold stars. 
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